Under the Ben Ali regime, Tunisian civil society was heavily restricted and subject to the state’s control.Footnote 9 In this context, migration was considered a particularly sensitive topic, to be kept in the hands of the Ministry of Interior. Thus, before the revolution, civil society activism on migration in Tunisia was extremely limited: there were no civil society organisations (CSOs) specialised on migration and asylum; the topic was largely absent from the media and public debate; and independent expression and political action by unauthorised associations was almost impossible (Bartels, 2015; Boubakri, 2013). After the revolution, the unprecedented increase in civil liberties prompted significant civil society activism, including in the field of migration and asylum (Mekouar, 2016).
Different types of CSOs became involved, namely: 1) well-established Tunisian diaspora organisations, which started to operate also in Tunisia, linking their claim for increased protection of migrant rights in Europe to requests for better treatment of migrants in Tunisia (e.g., Fédération des Tunisiens pour une Citoyenneté des Deux Rives - FTCR); 2) long-standing CSOs based in Tunisia working on human rights in general, economic and social rights, workers’ rights or women’s rights, which after the revolution started to embrace migrants’ rights in their advocacy work (e.g., Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme - LTDH, Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux - FTDES, Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens - UGTT, Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates - ATFD, Association des Femmes Tunisiennes Universitaires pour la Recherche et le Développement - AFTURD); 3) newly-established CSOs and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) specialised on migration- and asylum-related issues (e.g., Maison du droit et des migrations, Association Beity, Association des Familles Victimes de l’Immigration Clandestine - AFVIC, Association La Terre pour Tous).Footnote 10 Despite the differences in the thematic focus, methodology and scope of their actions, all these civil society stakeholders criticise the security-driven approach characterising EU-Tunisia cooperation and advocate for a human rights-based approach to migration.Footnote 11
The 2011 revolution did not only lead to the flourishing of CSOs in Tunisia, but it also opened the way for many international NGOs (INGOs) and NGO networks to establish and/or launch new activities and projects in Tunisia, usually in collaboration with local civil society (e.g., EuroMed Rights, France Terre D’Asile, Médécins du Monde, Islamic Relief, Red Crescent). INGOs (as well as other international actors and donors, such as international organisations, European foundations, European governmental agencies) that arrived in Tunisia after 2011 “brought not only funds, but also their interests and discursive frameworks with them” (Natter, 2018, pp. 11–12) and were relatively successful in promoting a change in how Tunisian institutional actors frame migration.
This section draws upon extensive fieldwork carried out in the context of the MEDRESET project. The fieldwork consisted of 22 interviews conducted in Tunisia in July 2017 and 7 additional interviews carried out via Skype or phone in February–March 2018 with a variety of stakeholders operating in the field of migration and asylum and/or involved in migration policy-making in Tunisia.Footnote 12 Interviewed civil society stakeholders included: Tunisian CSOs, NGOs and activistsFootnote 13; international NGOs and NGO networks with operational offices in TunisiaFootnote 14; Tunisian trade unions and employers’ associationsFootnote 15; Tunisian scholars and experts.Footnote 16 A limited number of interviews involved institutional stakeholders (i.e., Tunisian governmental actors and international organisations operating in Tunisia); these were included in order to add into the analysis the perspective of the institutional stakeholders with whom civil society actors usually relate and interact.
With regard to the representativeness of interviewed civil society stakeholders, it should be noted that the purpose of the research was to consult the organisations that are most influential and most actively engaged in the field of migration and asylum in Tunisia. However, focusing on the main CSOs dealing with migration has led us to involve mainly a certain type of civil society actors – i.e., relatively well-established and professionalised CSOs, with an international profile and strong ties with European stakeholders – as they are most actively involved in migration policy-making and in negotiations with the EU. Conversely, the genuinely local grassroots organisations, which are less organised and resourceful, have a limited international profile (or none at all), and are often unable or unwilling to access EU funding and participate in decision-making processes, were involved in our research to a more limited extent. This proves that, as observed by other authors, the EU support to South-Med civil society is selective, and targets specific actors with whom the EU deems it can work – namely national elites and well-established, professionalised and westernised CSOs (Bürkner & Scott, 2018).
Low salience and even lower politicisation: an issue for specialists
When asked to locate migration and mobility issues within a broader hierarchy of policy priorities, the large majority of interviewees admitted that, compared to other issues, migration is not perceived as a priority, neither by the Tunisian society as a whole, nor by Tunisian decision-makers. Therefore, the salience of migration as a policy issue in Tunisia appears to be rather limited; conversely, interviewees mentioned other policy issues, presenting them as serious and urgent problems that deserved prioritisation. These are: a) the overall socio-economic situation in the country, and specifically the issue of youth unemployment; b) other socio-economic issues, including: the situation of economic downturn, socio-economic inequalities between different regions across the country, poverty and under-development in rural areas, and the lack of economic reforms, investments and development policies; c) the still delicate political situation in the country, especially the ongoing process of democratic transition and difficulties related to it; and d) the issue of Islamic terrorism and security-related problems.
While some interviewees (some academics and INGOs) asserted that in Tunisia migration is absolutely not a priority, most interviewees included migration in the country’s hierarchy of policy priorities, but they linked it to the general socio-economic situation of the country. In this context, migration was predominantly framed as Tunisian emigration to Europe (especially emigration of young Tunisians) rather than African immigration to Tunisia, and it was portrayed as the unwelcome consequence of the country’s difficult socio-economic and political situation.
Several interviewees affirmed that in Tunisia migration is not a politicised issue. An academic explicitly stated that: “differently from the EU, in Tunisia no political party has used migration-related issues in political terms; migration is not the object of nationalist or xenophobic political positions; actually, it is not the object of political debate at all”.Footnote 17 According to the same interviewee, in 2011 there has been a public debate on migration in the country, although limited to the departure of young Tunisians towards Italy, and the related issue of those among them who died or disappeared during their journey (Ben Khalifa, 2013). However, this debate was limited to the issue of Tunisian migrants (and did not include, for instance, the issue of Sub-Saharan migrants who fled Libya and were hosted in Tunisia) and was in any case circumscribed to that specific period and events. These findings were confirmed also by other contemporary fieldwork-based studies (e.g., Abderrahim & Zardo, 2018).
The limited salience, high volatility and low politicisation of migration at the level of public opinion and in the confrontation between political parties in Tunisia are in clear contrast with the comparatively higher salience of the issue in Europe and its definitely higher level of politicisation and mediatisation, both at the national and European level. While in Tunisia, as confirmed by a governmental actor, “on the issue of migration and mobility there are no particular divergences between the government, civil society organisations active in this field and broader public opinion”,Footnote 18 in Europe migration-related issues are often made the object of political controversies and divergent claims involving different political parties, institutional and non-institutional actors, and the broader public opinion (Van der Brug, D’Amato, Ruedin, & Berkhout, 2015).
In addition, it must be noted that in Tunisia the issue of migration seems to be on the one hand removed from the public debate and on the other hand made the object of a specialised, technocratic knowledge. Whilst it does not seem to be perceived as an issue by the Tunisian people in general, migration is framed as a policy issue by “the specialists” or “the experts”, i.e., those civil society actors who are actively involved in migration policy-making. According to the above-cited academic, for instance, “even cooperation with the EU in the field of migration is not made the object of political debate; negotiations with the EU are framed as a merely technical issue and they are not mediatised at all; Tunisian civil society has no idea of what the mobility partnership, the readmission agreement or the visa facilitation agreement are; the only actors involved in this, along with the Tunisian government, are some expert CSOs and NGOs”.Footnote 19
Experts’ perceptions of a growing migratory complexity
Several interviewees (governmental actors, academics, local CSOs and INGOs) highlighted the fact that Tunisia’s migratory profile has significantly changed, especially after 2011, becoming increasingly complex and diversified. It was noted that, while Tunisia is still generally perceived as a country of emigration with a large diaspora abroad, it has also become a “migration hub”Footnote 20 – i.e., both a transit country for migrants and asylum seekers who are headed to Europe (but who may possibly end up staying in Tunisia) and a destination country for sub-Saharan students and workers.
As highlighted by those expert civil society actors who deal with migration-related issues, this growing migratory complexity poses significant new challenges in terms of migration governance. The increasing awareness, especially among civil society stakeholders, of the country’s migratory complexity is reflected in what interviewees identified as the main migration-related policy issues in the Tunisian context, the main factors affecting them and the actors who are considered to be responsible (or are blamed) for them.
The first policy issue singled out by most interviewees is Tunisian emigration towards Europe. This is still perceived by both Tunisian authorities and society in general as a primary concern in the field of migration governance, especially with regards to the issue of young Tunisians who cross the Mediterranean by boat in the attempt to reach Italy and Europe, commonly defined as “harraga”.Footnote 21 Civil society stakeholders identified different factors and actors affecting this phenomenon, focusing in particular on: a) the socio-economic situation in Tunisia; b) the responsibility of the Tunisian government in terms of lack of policies or ineffectiveness of existing policies; and c) the restrictive migration policies put in place by the EU and European countries. In relation to this, some interviewees emphasised also a substantial lack (or shortage) of legal migration opportunities for Tunisian workers in Europe. Some stakeholders focused specifically on the issue of highly-qualified labour migration and its implications for the country.Footnote 22
Secondly, the issue of refugees in Tunisia was also mentioned as a relevant migration-related issue for the country. However, this issue has a very precise temporal and spatial location, as it concerns the inflow of refugees from Libya to southern Tunisia following the 2011 Libyan war. The war actually caused two distinct inflows of refugees, the Sub-Saharans and the Libyans. While the inflow of sub-Saharan refugees was generally framed in negative terms by both the Tunisian people and public institutions (“the images of masses of people in precarious conditions in the Choucha camp remained impressed in our collective memory as an infernal circle”Footnote 23), the inflow of Libyan nationals was perceived rather positively (“Libyans were welcomed in Tunisia as ‘brothers’ and hosted in the houses of Tunisians; there were no integration issues”Footnote 24). This is also linked to the fact that the Libyans arrived in Tunisia with significant financial resources and invested in the real estate business, partly compensating for the economic downturn that Tunisia was undergoing.Footnote 25
Some expert civil society stakeholders mentioned as a policy issue also the fact that a proposal for a new national asylum law (drafted in partnership with the UNHCR) is stuck in the Parliament since a couple of years. Interviewees provided two different explanations of the causes of this impasse. Most of them affirmed that the problem is not a lack of political will; rather, the Tunisian Parliament has a huge backlog of law reforms to discuss, and the creation of a national asylum system is not among the country’s or the government’s priorities. Conversely, a minority of interviewees argued that this is a political blockage, i.e. a strategy put in place by Tunisia in response to the European pressures to pass the law, aimed at contrasting any possible European project of externalisation of the asylum procedures in North Africa.Footnote 26
Thirdly, the issue of sub-Saharan immigration to Tunisia was identified as a specific policy issue only by expert CSOs, migrant associations and NGOs working specifically on this topic. These actors highlighted several problems relating to the legal and policy framework regulating immigration to Tunisia, which is considered to be too restrictive, oriented to the criminalisation of migrants, and informed by a securitising approach. They criticised in particular the imposition of penalties on irregular migrants and the virtual impossibility for them to regularise their stay in Tunisia.Footnote 27
With regards to the living and working conditions of sub-Saharan migrants in Tunisia, expert civil society stakeholders stressed specific challenges related to human rights protection (focusing in particular on access to labour and labour rights) and poor integration in the Tunisian society (highlighting problems related to housing and residential segregation). The related issue of discrimination, racism and xenophobia targeting African people in Tunisia was also described as serious and widespread. Therefore, specialised civil society actors framed in overall negative terms the situation of sub-Saharan migrants in the country and the existing Tunisian legal and policy framework on immigration, which was described by several interviewees as “outdated” and “unsuitable” for a country that has become also a destination of migrant flows. Following the revolution, specialised NGOs and migrant associations have been voicing their criticism and advocating for a reform of Tunisian immigration law, also with the support of Tunisian academics and INGOs (Ben Jemia & Achour, 2014). The main objectives of their advocacy actions vis-à-vis the national government were: de-penalising irregular migration, enhancing migrant rights’ protection and migrant integration, and combating discrimination and racism.
Therefore, these actors considered as a problematic issue in itself the persisting stalemate of the reform of Tunisian immigration law – a process initiated in 2011 by the newly-established State Secretariat for Migration and Tunisians Abroad, with the elaboration of a comprehensive National Migration Strategy, i.e., a new legal and policy framework on immigration, emigration and asylum drafted in cooperation with Tunisian civil society (Ben Jemia & Achour, 2014). Since 2013 a draft version of the National Migration Strategy has been circulating, but it has never been officially adopted by the government. According to expert civil society stakeholders, multiple factors have contributed to this impasse, including: the sometimes problematic relations between different national institutions involved in migration policy-making and the overlapping of their competences; EU-Tunisia relations and the pressures exercised by the EU on the Tunisian government through its cooperation policiesFootnote 28; the uncertain political situation in LibyaFootnote 29; and the lack of a truly participatory decision-making process actively involving CSOs.
When considering the factors and actors affecting the above-mentioned policy issues, interviewees addressed also the lack of inter-governmental cooperative relations among southern Mediterranean countries. According to Tunisian civil society stakeholders, the lack of strategic regional alliances, especially in the field of migration, may be linked to two factors: a) southern Mediterranean countries tend to accept and uncritically perpetuate the European framing of Euro-Mediterranean relations as purely bilateral one-to-one relations, following the model of the European Neighbourhood Policy; and b) each country perceives its general situation and its national interests as individual, peculiar and often in conflict or competition with those of its neighbours.Footnote 30
Civil society actors’ evaluation of EU-Tunisia cooperation on migration
Civil society actors highlighted that current European policies addressing Tunisia are obsessively focused on improving border control and increasing effective returns, while cooperation in other policy fields, such as labour migration and development – which would be beneficial to reducing irregular migration – is made conditional to cooperation in stemming maritime migration flows.
More in general, civil society stakeholders claimed the need for more equal and balanced relations between the EU and Tunisia in all policy fields.Footnote 31 They also stressed that Tunisia should not adapt its priorities to the representation the EU has of the country and more in general of the southern Mediterranean shore; rather, it should provide its own alternative representation, and should upheld its own priorities in the negotiations with the EU.Footnote 32 As concerns more specifically the governance of migration, interviewees were generally in favour of implementing more balanced, integrated and comprehensive cooperation policies. These should not be limited to border control, but should also speak to different policy areas, so that EU-Tunisia relations are overall more coherent.Footnote 33
As concerns specific EU-Tunisia cooperation initiatives in the area of migration (i.e., the European Readmission Agreement (EURA), the Visa Facilitation Agreement (VFA) and the Mobility Partnership), it is worth noting that the Tunisian government and a majority of Tunisian CSOs and NGOs share the same position and have formed a “united front” vis-à-vis the European Union. This is especially true for the ongoing parallel negotiations for readmission and visa facilitation agreements.Footnote 34 The main points of this shared position are: that the EURA must be linked to the VFA (thus, enhanced cooperation on readmission on the part of Tunisia is conditional to the establishment of a facilitated visa regime for Tunisian nationals); that readmission obligations cannot include third country nationals; and that readmission cannot be carried out based on a “European laissez-passer”. Interviewees affirmed that these three points are firmly non-negotiable.Footnote 35
With regard to one of the most recent policy developments in the external dimension of the EU migration policy – i.e., the EU-Turkey Agreement and its possible replication in other contexts (mentioned above in the third section), Tunisian civil society actors confirmed that “following the EU-Turkey deal, the European strategy changed a bit; we witnessed more pressures on Tunisia, and offers of relevant financial agreements as a quid pro quo for increased cooperation, based on a similar mechanism as the EU-Turkey one; what we are trying to avoid as civil society is that the Tunisian government finds itself in the same situation as Turkey”.Footnote 36
Therefore, generally-speaking Tunisian civil society actors seem to share the overall critical framing of European CSOs and international NGOs on the EU’s external migration policies in the Mediterranean area, which are criticised for their security-oriented and conditionality-based approach (Roman, 2018a). At the same time, most Tunisian CSOs have established a united front with Tunisian authorities aimed at promoting more equal and balanced EU-Tunisia relations and less Euro-centric and sectoral migration cooperation policies. In fact, despite an overall critical stance towards the EU external migration policies, most Tunisian expert CSOs and NGOs are keen to be involved in a constructive dialogue with national and European institutions and claim an active role in decision-making processes in the field of migration.
Thus, rather than taking a more radically antagonistic stance towards the EU and/or the national government and refusing dialogue with institutional actors, the majority of Tunisian civil society stakeholders display a cooperative attitude and value the opportunity of being involved in EU-Tunisia negotiations in the area of migration. Moreover, the substantial convergence of views between Tunisian institutional and civil society actors on the main EU-Tunisia migration cooperation initiatives may result in a stronger “Tunisian position” vis-à-vis the EU and European countries.
Conversely, the fieldwork carried out in Morocco as part of the MEDRESET project showed that Moroccan CSOs have a more radically critical stance towards the EU’s and European countries’ cooperation policies, including in the field of migration, which are considered as a continuation of the European colonialist policies in the African continent. For this reason Moroccan CSOs are apparently less keen to be involved in a political dialogue with the EU (Harrami & Mouna, 2018).Footnote 37