Before describing the narratives uncovered and the nexus embedded in them, it is important to punctuate some general features concerning their nature. First, narratives have been dispersed and fragmented throughout EU official documents, appointing no clear pattern to when and where references to this nexus are likely to be found. This lack of focus could be an indication that this link does not seem to be a priority to the EU, being solely rhetoric.
Secondly, although several documents refer to this nexus, some important ones do not make any explicit reference to it. An example is the recently issued European Agenda on Migration (Commission, 2015b). Consequently, even if narratives do exist, their inclusion within EU official discourse seems to be still a matter of ambiguity and controversy, especially if in comparison to the narratives of the migration-development and migration-security nexuses. An indication is that out of 143 documents, 43 have been coded under the child node ‘root-causes-democratization’, 86 under the ‘root-cause-development’ and 83 under the ‘remote-control’ one. This finding does not imply that narratives concerning the ‘democratization-migration’ nexus are less important, but it does suggest the prominence of the other two, as already indicated by the literature.
Another observation should be made regarding the definition of democracy. Since democratization refers mainly to the process through which countries achieve a democratic system, this is undeniably a key concept. In general, the EU conceives democracy positively and assumes it as a desirable goal. Moreover, democracy is usually associated with other values, mainly good governance, respect to the rule of law and human rights. However, it is interesting that even if conceived as a central value and an essential element of EU relations with the southern Mediterranean, democracy is neither straightforwardly defined in the documents analysed nor perceived as something that needs further explanation. This means that the EU is, to a certain extent, assuming its universality.
Despite this, researchers stress that there would be a deep disagreement between the EU and its partners in the South concerning the concepts of democracy and human rights (Aliboni, 2004). Such disagreement would not only be conceptual but also political, due to discrepancies in how to actually achieve it (ibid). It is argued that the EU conceives (liberal) democracy as a Western value leaving aside other (mainly Arab) narratives on democracy (Sadiki, 2004). In general, this is important because the lack of a clear definition of democracy on the one hand, and the lack of agreement and inclusion of other perspectives from the South on the other, has already been associated with EU shortcomings in terms of democracy promotion in the region (Jonasson, 2013).
EU policy narratives before the ‘Arab spring’: lack-of-democracy-as-root-cause narrative
From the analysis of ‘problem statements’ extracted from EU documents from 1995 to 2010, one dominant narrative could be identified. Within it, the main ‘problem’ the EU has been concerned with, was irregular and forced migration. Mainly, documents refer to the challenges posed by the ‘massive arrival of immigrants’ and the ‘exodus of refugees’ coming from or through southern Mediterranean countries. Both sorts of flows are portrayed as having destabilizing effects and posing security problems to the EU, although refugee flows are considered as less problematic.
Such ‘problem’ has been associated with many ‘causes’, among which ‘structural causes’ have been conceived as central ones. It is argued that irregular and forced migration is rooted in particular social, political and economic conditions in the countries of origin (push-factors). This means that alongside the more acknowledged economic drivers (i.e. poverty, unemployment) the EU also identifies political drivers as a main cause of population displacement in the region.
On the one hand, dictatorship or lack of democracy and related factors such as poor governance, disrespect to the rule of law, human rights abuse, political persecution, generalized corruption etc., are believed to be at the source of migration flows from neighbouring Mediterranean countries:
“Ill-functioning democratic structures, weak institutions, the absence of the rule of law and bad governance are all major push factors for forced migration”(Commission2002).
“Believes that massive immigration is a result of [inter alia] human rights violations [ … ] political persecutions, political instability, corruption and dictatorships in many of the countries of origin” (Parliament, 2006).
On the other hand, lack of democracy is considered a source of instability and insecurity, conditions that have also been associated by the EU with the increase of irregular and forced migratory flows. In fact, the EU underlines the idea that political drivers are not independent but instead, they are linked with other drivers, such as poverty, development, stability, security, etc. The EU emphasizes the idea that migration has multiple and complex causes and for this reason should be addressed by a comprehensive approach (Parliament, 2006, 2007; Commission 2002, 2006). This means that autocracies or ill-functioning democracies would be one among many interlinked push-factors of migration.
If lack of democracy is perceived as a driver of migration, its advancement in the neighbourhood is seen as a central and favourable condition for EU goals of controlling migration at the source. Thus, a main argument found within EU narrative is that such structural condition in sending countries should be a matter of concern. Already in 1995, the Commission argued that “Defending and promoting human rights is also a means of tackling the huge movements of population which are caused by crisis and conflict” (Commission, 1995). Similarly, in 1999 it was stated in a European Council that:
“The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires [ … ] consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, women and children” (European Council,
1999
).
The Parliament also defended the necessity of supporting the consolidation of democracy in third countries for achieving these same goals in the report on the Creation of the High Level Working Group (Parliament, 2000).
Apart from being an end in itself, since it would address structural political drivers of migration, democratic development is considered to be source of stability, security and peace, conditions that are also positively associated by the EU with the decrease of migration flows. Likewise, democratization could also eventually lead to more development – which would mean addressing socio-economic drivers, such as poverty, unemployment and inequality.
The importance of these policy areas and the inter-links between them become even more evident when considering the main policy frameworks for cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean area. Both the launch of the Barcelona Process in 1995 and the European Neighbourhood Policy [ENP] in 2004 had within their main goals the promotion of stability, security and prosperity in the region. A necessary condition for the fulfilment of these goals would be strengthening democracy and respect for human rights. As a result, both initiatives had within their core the promotion and support for democracy in the neighbourhood (Barcelona Declaration, 1995; Commission, 2005a, 2004). The ENP specifically, when announced, created many prospects for democracy promotion (Khakee, 2010), to the point of being conceived as the Union ‘newest democratization tool’ (Barbé & Johansson-Nogués, 2008). Regardless of the actual fulfilment of these goals, the idea of creating a “ring of well governed countries” (Commission 2004) is key for EU’s objective of promoting stability and prosperity in its Southern neighbourhood and consequently, in its borders.
Finally, two important ideas about the future (scenarios) found in the EU narrative seem to have helped configuring and reinforcing the narrative. The first scenario is that irregular migration is not expected to decrease; on the contrary, it is set to continue or even accelerate, mainly because it is rooted in structural features of the Mediterranean that are unlikely to disappear in the short-term (Commission 2002). This prognostic reinforces the argument of applying long-term and comprehensive solutions tackling the structural drivers of migration, among which lies the promotion of democratization.
The second scenario is related to the successive migration ‘crises’ and the raise of migrants death toll. In particular, two ‘crises’ had a symbolical impact in the narrative and triggered policymaking processes within the EU in the middle 2000’s. The first one occurred mainly during 2005, when the number of migrants crossing the fenced borders of Ceuta and Melilla (two Spanish enclaves in the Northern coast of Morocco) raised considerably (“5 African migrants killed and scores,” 2005; “Under fire at Europe's border,” 2005). In this process, several migrants ended up severely injured and 13 were reported deadFootnote 7 due to the excessive force and use of ‘dissuasive’ equipment by the police at both sides of the border. The second one, known as the ‘cayucos crisis’, happened in 2006, when more than 31,000 migrants (a record number) reached the Canary Islands successfully after sailing the Atlantic from the shores of Mauritania and Senegal in fishing boats (cayucos). Spanish immigration officials estimated that at least 6000 people have died or gone missing while attempting to make this risky crossing during this same period (“Canaries migrant death toll soars,” 2016).
At this point and in face of these scenarios, the EU started perceiving the situation of irregular and forced migration with a sense of urgency, underlining the necessity of taking action and stopping the human tragedy that was taking place in its borders. Already in 2005, which coincided with the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration (Commission, 2005a), the EU launched the Global Approach to Migration (GAM) (Council, 2005). This new framework intended to respond to the need for a balanced, global and coherent approach that could face the short-term challenge of reducing illegal immigration and the loss of lives and at the same time recognize the importance of tackling the root-causes of migration (Ibid). As a result, the EU defended the necessity of not only ‘combating’ but also ‘preventing’ these flows putting emphasis on the “urgent need to combat the root-causes of migration” (Paris Declaration, 2008).
Therefore, the nexus observed in the dominant narrative could be summarized as it follows (see Fig. 4): the EU perceives lack of democracy as a root-cause of migratory and refugee flows. This means that EU promotion and support to democratic consolidation in ‘sending’ countries in the southern Mediterranean is believed to contribute to addressing the migratory ‘problem’ – i.e. irregular and forced migration – since it addresses the main structural factors causing and perpetuating it, directly or indirectly. This means that the EU considers democratization as part of its ‘solution pack’ within its migration policy goals and strategies.
EU policy narratives post- ‘Arab spring’
The first years (2011–12): continuity despite change
At the time that the ‘Arab spring’ in 2011 started to unfold, transforming the political and social landscape of the Mediterranean, the core story sustained by the EU continued to be the same. Irregular and forced migration remained a central problem for the EU that ought to be fought and prevented. Similarly, lack of democracy continued to be professed as an important structural push-factor of migration and refugee flows.
For this reason, providing a solution to this problem would pass through supporting the democratization processes unfolding in the southern Mediterranean. In fact, EU first reactions to the Arab uprisings were actually in this line, reinforcing the existing narrative. Among EU main initiatives was the launch of the “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity” (Commission, 2011a), which was an intent to take a qualitative step forward in EU relations with its southern neighbours and to provide short-term support to the democratic change unfolding in the region (Bauer, 2015). Under this new framework, the EU reconceptualised democracy and redesigned its strategy for democracy promotion.
Another development in this direction was the revision of the ENP in 2011Footnote 8. An important aspect of this revision is related to the introduction of a ‘new policy’ of conditionality: the ‘more for more’ approach (Pace, 2014), which is embedded in the ENP idea of implementing a positive conditionality tool (Abdalla, 2016). According to this policy, the EU would be willing to offer the ‘three Ms’ (money, mobility and market) to countries that advanced significantly in terms of political reforms:
“Increased EU support to its neighbours is conditional. It will depend on progress in building and consolidating democracy and respect for the rule of law. The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will get from the EU” (Commission,
2011b
).
Here it is already possible to spot some small changes in the narrative due to the introduction of new elements in the proposed solutions, which apart from not modifying its core elements, have even worked to reinforce them. First, the idea of building a stronger partnership with the people, mainly through giving greater support to the civil society in Mediterranean countries was introduced (Commission, 2011b). Second, promoting people-to-people contact across the Mediterranean was proposed as a way to support burgeoning democratisation in North Africa (Commission, 2011c, 2011d, 2011e). In other words, the EU should enhance the positive effects of migration in terms of promoting human development and democracy in fragile states (Parliament, 2011a). In fact, at this point the GAM was renewed, becoming the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (Commission, 2011e). This updated version reaffirmed the externalized approach introduced in 2005, giving enhanced focus on better organizing and promoting mobility of third country nationals (ibid). Finally, a special emphasis has also been given to the role of the youth in the process of democratization (Commission, 2012; Council, 2012).
At this point, it seems that the events unfolding in the region provided an empirical validation of the dominant narrative, reinforcing the need for promoting democracy in order to stem and prevent irregular and forced migration. Thus, in a certain sense, these events led to a continuity of the narrative despite the changes unfolding in the region, marking the “re-launch of EU ‘normative ambitions’ for the Arab countries” (Seeberg, 2015, p. 41; Bauer, 2015).
The aftermath of the ‘Arab spring’ and the ‘migration crisis’: towards a narrative dualism
As previously described, the first years of the ‘Arab spring’ created opportunities for strengthening the dominant narrative. However, some key variations could already be perceived in the years that followed the revolutions and especially in the context of the so-called ‘migration crisis’.
An important element of change concern the nature of the problem. Although the idea of ‘mass influx’ of migrants has always been present in the EU narrative, from 2015 onwards it gained a new input. This is closely related to the perception of flows as being uncontrolled, growing and mixed (i.e. as containing both displaced people and economic migrants). Moreover, since then, the EU stresses to be facing a crisis configured by an “unprecedented influx” of migrants, referring to it as the “biggest refugee crisis since the WWII”. In fact, Geddes and Hadj-Abdou (2018) emphasized how the use of the word crisis would reflect EU difficulties for dealing with this ‘new’ context in the neighbourhood and the necessity of providing solutions accordingly. At the same time, these authors also highlighted how the EU started perceiving this reality of external migratory pressure as the ‘new normal’, that is, as something that is unlikely to change in the near future.
Concerning the causes of these migratory flows, the EU places a new emphasis on the instability variable, which would arise from the contexts of war, armed conflicts, violence as well as situations of political and economic crises that could be appreciated all across the Mediterranean at the time. This means that structural factors are complemented with other drivers believed to be more ‘circumstantial’ and ‘transitory’. Another novelty is that the EU seems to be concerned with sources of instability that might come from outside the security domain, such as poverty, sense of injustice, corruption, and a general lack of social and economic development in countries of origin, especially among the youth (Commission, 2015a). Most importantly, these destabilizing socio-economic conditions are believed to be exacerbated in a situation of lack of democratic principles (Parliament, 2011a, 2011b).
In this context, supporting and promoting democracy (and related values) in the Mediterranean is still conceived as a solution to the migration problem not only because it would address structural political conditions in the region, but also because it would be a way of tackling instability and insecurity:
“Migration flows arising from instability are a challenge for the European Union. Wars and armed conflicts, ethnic tension, systematic violations of human rights - such as the refusal to allow people to practise their religious faith - natural disasters and the lack of proper economic and democratic structures are the main causes of this type of migration flow” (Parliament 2015).
Considering this new scenario, it could be argued that the dominant narrative has changed slightly in comparison to the two other periods aforementioned; mainly due to the increased emphasis on the elements of crisis and instability, which moved to the centre of the narrative. Still, it should also be noticed that the narrative’s core elements and causal logic have remained the same. This clearly indicates that lack of democracy continued to be framed as a root-cause of migration despite the introduction of these mediating variables (see Fig. 5).
The analysis revealed that this new context not only led to the reconfiguration of the dominant narrative but has also led to the emergence of a ‘different’ and ‘contradictory’ narrative, whose core arguments runs counter the ones found so far in the dominant narratives. Mainly, the EU started to link the historic events unfolding in the region – the Arab uprisings – with the unprecedented augmentation of migration flows heading towards Europe.
Even if not explicitly mentioned, behind this argument is the idea of refugee hump. Similar to the phenomenon of migration hump, according to which successful development would induce more and not less migration (Commission 2002), refugee hump explains how “democratization” and “democracy promotion” may lead to an increase in migratory flows. This is mainly because processes of democratization and political change may be a source of instability, social upheaval and uncertainty and, at least in the short/medium term, produce an escalation in forced migration (Schmeidl, 2001 quoted by van Hear & Sørensen-Nyberg, 2002). However, differently from the literature, the EU considers these processes as key drivers of both ‘forced’ and ‘irregular’ (i.e. ‘voluntary’) migration. Some fragments extracted from Commission documents help illustrating how the EU constructs this argument:
“The events in the Southern Mediterranean bring hope for a better life for millions of people in our neighbourhood, as well as for greater respect of human rights, pluralism, the rule of law and social justice. As is often the case for democratic uprisings, they may also entail, in the short and medium term, upheaval and uncertainty. Political unrest and military conflicts have led to the loss of human lives and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people [ … ]” (Commission,
2011c
).
“[ … ] policies need to address the different root causes of irregular and forced migration, inter alia political change and instability” (Commission,
2014
).
“Over the past ten years, there have been significant political developments in the neighbourhood. Today’s neighbourhood is less stable than it was ten years ago. [ … ] These events have served to increase the challenges faced by both the EU and its partners, aggravating economic and social pressures, irregular migration and refugee flows, security threats and leading to diverging aspirations (Commission,
2015a
)”.
Although it cannot be said that democratization stopped being a desirable goal, there is at least a perception that the EU should be cautious when supporting this process, since it may have the undesirable effect of producing more instability, and, consequently, more migration (refugee hump). Therefore, based on this argument, the idea of postponing the promotion of democracy and good governance to the longer-term becomes even more evident and easy to sustain rhetorically. Meanwhile, in the shorter-term, the EU can focus on addressing instability and stemming migration flows arising from it through rapid solutions.
The emphasis on promoting stability can be appreciated by looking into two key policy developments that happen alongside 2015. The first one was the launching of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons (Council, 2015). Within the Trust Fund top priorities lies enhancing stability and governance, which should be achieved by promoting conflict prevention, security and rule of law enforcement. It is important to underline that the focus on state building here is mainly thought as a way of improving border and migration management (i.e. stemming migration), and not as a tool for promoting democracy. Most interestingly, through this policy, ‘strengthening the resilience of vulnerable people’ arises as a key priority that will gain increasing attention and centrality in subsequent policy initiatives (Council, 2015). The second development worth highlighting is the fact that the ENP underwent another strategic revision during 2015, in which stabilization was reinforced as the main political priority that should be tackled across sectors, “making partner countries places where people want to build their future, and help tackle uncontrolled movement of people” (Commission, 2015a, p. 4).
In sum, it can be observed that within this counter-narrative the nexus between EU external migration policies and democratization contradicts what has been identified so far in the other narratives, mainly because the causal logic is completely inverted. In this case, democratization is not viewed as a solution to irregular and forced migration. Contrarily, it is framed as a potential driver (push-factor) of this problem since it can eventually lead to destabilization (uprisings, insecurity and even conflict) in the short term and unleash an influx of forced and irregular migration (refugee hump) (see Fig. 6). As a result, the solutions envisioned would not pass through supporting further democratization, as sustained by the dominant narrative, but through prioritizing the stability and security in the region.
A truly polarized issue?
Apart from their overall configuration and differences over time, the analysis has also revealed how EU actors (mainly the Commission, the Parliament and the Council) cast different narratives and had divergent perceptions of this nexus and its importance within EU broader strategy.
Although it is true that there seems to be a convergence towards one dominant narrative (lack-of-democracy-as-a-root-cause), EU institutional bodies seem to differ in how they refer to it. In the case of the Council, it has not been surprising to observe that this body rarely makes explicit reference to this nexus; indicating that this narrative has not been a priority. Moreover, when mentioning it, the Council tends to avoid using words like ‘democratization’ and ‘dictatorship’, giving preference to less politically charged terms and repeating the ambiguous ‘good/poor governance mantra’:
“tackling the root causes of migration, for example through the creation of livelihood opportunities [ … ] and promotion of economic growth, good governance and the protection of human rights” (Council,
2005
).
The Council confirms its commitment to mobilise all appropriate instruments and policies and support efforts to address the root causes of migratory flows, in particular conflicts, political instability, human rights violations, poor socio-economic development, including lack of employment opportunities, poor governance and climate change (Council,
2015
).
The Parliament, in contrast, has been much clearer when referring to this nexus. In fact, it is the main actor making straightforward statements appointing to the lack of democracy and dictatorship as important structural factors behind migration flows. Likewise, it also refers to the promotion of democratization in the Southern Neighbourhood as an essential solution in several occasions. This would be in line with the normative historical role associated to the Parliament, which would be the ‘symbol of democracy’ in Europe and the ‘loudspeaker for basic democratic rights’ (Feliu & Serra, 2015, p. 30). A role that is not only externally appointed but also self-ascribed: “the key importance of the European Parliament in enhancing freedom and democracy in our neighbourhood; in this context, believes that the European Parliament should monitor closely the democratisation process in the southern Mediterranean” (Parliament, 2011a).
Moreover, the Parliament has been particularly critical and concerned with the role of other EU institutional bodies when incorporating and addressing this nexus. It emphasizes the importance of maintaining an inter-institutional dialogue on the matter, denouncing the lack of communication and feedback, especially between the Parliament and the Council (Feliu & Serra, 2015; Parliament, 2011b). It has also been critical towards other EU bodies, such as the Commission and the EEAS, calling them to make “further efforts with regard to the development and democratisation of countries of origin and to promote the rule of law, in order to tackle the problems associated with migration at their root” (Parliament, 2011a; Parliament, 2016a). Finally, this body has been particularly concerned with the possible divergence of development and democratization funds towards the goal of stemming migration (Parliament, 2016a), such as using Official Development Assistance (ODA) for policies aimed at deterring and controlling migration (Parliament, 2016b).
Alongside the Parliament, the Commission has also been a protagonist in casting the dominant narrative on this matter. However, this actor seems to be more sceptical in relation to the effectiveness of policies promoting human rights and democracy on addressing the root-causes of migration. This is somehow related to the fact that push-factors are considered to be complex and unlikely to disappear (Commission, 2006). For this reason, the promotion of democracy and related values is conceived mainly as a complementary tool of migration control instead of as a central one. Moreover, despite agreeing with the Parliament in many instances, the Commission has been casting stories that might be contradictory to the dominant narrative, mainly the one relating political changes with increased migration flows (democratization-as-push-factor narrative).
Considering the aforementioned, it could not be affirmed that within the EU this nexus constitutes a truly polarized issue, mainly because most of the times narratives are either absent or tend to converge. Nonetheless, we can still spot some different and even contradictory stories coming from various institutional voices. This would confirm the ambivalence and inconsistencies of the EU external migration action, something that has been already underlined by the literature (Lavenex, 1999; Richey 2012; Geddes & Lixi, 2018). In particular, the Parliament holds a much more critical perspective when addressing the democratization-migration nexus in comparison to the Commission and the Council, which are, in fact, the main institutional bodies in the driver’s seat of the EU external migration policies. This indicates that if the Parliament was to be given its real share of power in the formulation of these policies, as stipulated in the Treaty of Lisbon, one could expect the narratives concerning this nexus to gain more prominence.