There is a great deal of work on the place of human capital and the cost of migration on economic outcomes. Building on Becker’s (1992) work, this perspective focuses on different individual characteristics, and argues that education and skills are important for explaining differences in the likelihood of obtaining employment as well as the relative difference in income between individuals. Applied to immigration, however, some educational qualifications and skills may not be perfectly transferable between countries. These skills could be labour-market information, destination-language proficiency and occupational licences, certifications or credentials, as well as more narrowly defined task-specific skills (Chiswick et al., 2005). The lower the international transferability of the skills, the wider the initial gap in native–immigrant employment and earnings. This initial gap, however, is expected to diminish with time in the country as immigrants acquire host country skills like language and other country specific skills.
Institutional factors like migration selection systems and integration policies can also affect integration of immigrants in the labour market. Canada uses a point system to select about a third of all immigrants based on the demand for skills which should increase the possibility that those admitted will “integrate” quickly into the labour market.Footnote 4 Sweden does not use such a system but is part of the European Union which gives all EU citizens, including Polish citizens since 2004, mobility rights and the right to seek employment anywhere within the EU. While EU residents can freely enter Sweden and search for work, in practical terms, labour migration to Sweden is primarily demand driven. Economic immigrants usually have a job offer prior to entry however, with EU residents automatically getting permanent resident status, while non-EU immigrants would usually enter under limited term (renewable) contracts.
In general, regardless of policy regime, earlier studies on employment and earnings integration, conclude that immigrants have lower employment levels and earnings as compared to the native-born population (see Antecol et al., 2003; Borjas, 1994; Chiswick, 1978; OECD, 2007; Pendakur & Pendakur, 2015).
Gorodzeisky and Semyonov (2017), maintain that there are two types of comparative studies. Most studies assess the labour market inclusion of immigrants (or different groups of immigrants) in a single host society. Far fewer studies take an international comparative perspective studying immigrant integration across countries. This study follows the second strategy, assessing the labour market inclusion of Polish immigrants and their children in two countries, Canada, and Sweden. This comparison allows us to understand how a specific group fares based on different policy and social circumstance. We add to this understanding by including an assessment of the native-born Polish population. In line with the economic assimilation model and in contrast to immigrants, the second generation is fostered and educated in the “host” society and should therefore not experience similar disadvantages as their parents in accessing and doing a career in the labour market.
One challenge to understanding the place of Poles in host countries is that research specific to Poles is relatively recent, and generally restricted to the post-EU expansion of 2004 (see for example: Burrell, 2010; Drozdzewski, 2011; Forrest & Kusek, 2016; Kaczmarczyk & Tyrowicz, 2015; Markowski and Kwapisz-Williams, 2013; Odé, 1996). Where the place of Polish immigrants is studied, it is often in the context of more global work that encompasses a large number of groups (see for example: Bevelander, 1999; Drinkwater et al., 2010; Kogan, 2010; Levrau et al., 2013). Work that looks at outcomes for the second generation is even rarer (Dahlstedt, 2015; Pendakur & Pendakur, 1998, 2015).
In an Australia study Forrest and Kusek (2016), use Census data for the years 2006 and 2011, to trace the labour market and spatial integration of Polish immigrants as well as their children and grandchildren. They point to the importance of generational factors, concluding that there is a linear progression over generations and that third-generation individuals with Polish ancestry are indistinguishable from other Australians in terms of education attainment, home ownership and labour market participation. In Belgium a qualitative study on the Polish community in Antwerp show low unemployment levels for Polish immigrants compared to other immigrant groups (Levrau et al., 2013). Results for Germany by Kogan (2010) using 2005 microcensus data indicate that Polish immigrants have somewhat lower employment levels compared to native Germans. They conclude that the difference is mainly explained by human capital characteristics and not by an ethnic penalty. Conversely at all using register data for Germany from 1995 to 2006 conclude that the wage differentials between German and Polish immigrants were the largest of all East European groups. Miera (2008) looks more specifically at Polish entrepreneurs in Berlin using in-depth interviews. She points to the importance of transnational networks that allow Polish entrepreneurs to exploit cross-border differences in purchasing power of both goods and people to compete in the German market. In a similar study, Nowicka (2013), looks at transnationalism amongst seven Polish entrepreneurs in Munich. She uses Bourdieu’s notions of capital to assess how different forms of capital (both social and fiscal) move across national boundaries, arguing that Polish migrants are able to exploit these resources and react to labour market demand (page 43).
Jon Friberg has taken several looks at Polish workers in Norway. Friberg (2012b) uses a combination of survey and register data to assess the probability of permanent moves by Polish migrant workers to Norway. He creates a model in which “decisions about length of stay, settlement and return are dependent upon the migrants’ desires for the future and upon their opportunities to realise these desires (page 1603).” These desires can change over time based on the creation of changing work and social conditions. Similarly, Friberg et al (2014) looks at how labour market outcomes for Polish migration to Oslo, Copenhagen and Reykjavik, are shaped by the different labour markets. They conclude that all three regimes have problems both incorporating and protecting new migrant workers. Polish workers are particularly affected because they are often recruited for low skill, low wage occupations which lend themselves to exploitation. However, while cultural attributes can help in the short term, Friberg (2012a) argues that Norwegian employers are reluctant to offer permanent employment unless Polish workers assimilate to the “Norwegian work culture” (pp: 1914).
One of the countries that has had the largest inflow of Polish migrants since the enlargement of 2004 is the UK. Based on the Labour Force Survey for the years 2004–2007 of the UK, Drinkwater et al. (2010) show that the employment rate for Polish immigrants is 10 percent higher than the average employment level in the UK, about 9 percent higher than in other countries that joined the EU in 2004, and about 20 percent higher than other immigrant groups. Cieslik (2011) looked Polish workers in the UK within the context of job quality using a combination of 139 surveys and 60 in-depth interviews. She concludes that opportunities for advancement and employment conditions (such as child care) influence the decision to return to Poland, but that this is tempered by the opportunities that exist in Poland. Ciupijus (2011) looks at Polish labour migrants in the UK within the context of EU membership and post-national citizenship. He argues that, while EU membership offered greater opportunities for migration and lower working restrictions, work in the UK was characterized by downward occupational mobility. Garapich (2008) looks more specifically at the role of market forces on inclusion into both social and economic systems in the UK. He argues that the migration industry (defined as a set of for profit specialised social actors and commercial institutions) has usurped the place of traditional actors (such as the church or social service organizations) and that this is a positive move (page 736). Similar to Miera (2008) and Nowicka (2013), Knight et al (2014) look at the importance of social networks but in the context of Wales, a second level migration centre. They argue that social networks can act to both enable and disable labour market progression, with such networks being most useful in the initial stages of migration.
As noted above, a number of articles on employment integration include Poles as one of many groups studied. Bevelander (2000), for example, looks at employment levels for native Swedes and Polish immigrants (ages 20–64) for the census years 1960–1990 and shows that Polish males have an employment level of 81 percent in 1960 and only 70 percent in 1990. For native men the level is roughly 83 percent across the entire period. For female Polish immigrants the employment level in 1960 is 44 percent, rising to 64 percent in 1990. Native Swedish women in the same period show an employment rate of 36 percent in 1960, rising to 80 percent by1990. Bevelander argues that the declining employment success of (Polish) immigrants in the Swedish labour market is a result of broader structural changes which saw the economy move from a primarily industrial to a service economy with more flexible work organisations. This led to an up-shift in the demand for skilled qualifications which affected immigrants negatively. Rosholm, et al. (2006) come to a similar conclusion when comparing outcomes in Denmark and Sweden. Using a survey conducted by Statistics Sweden in the year 1993, Duvander (2001) tried to explain the unemployment risk for Finnish, Polish, Iranian and Chilean immigrants controlling for place of education (Sweden or in their home country), whether they speak and understand Swedish well, and lived with a Swedish partner. Their results indicated that the unemployment risk did not diminish substantially by including these factors and therefore the difference in unemployment risk between native and immigrants could be indicating discrimination.
Work on Polish minorities in Canada tends to be found in more global work on minorities in general. Pendakur and Pendakur (2015), for example use 2006 census data to look at earnings differentials for immigrants and Canadian-born minorities. They find that Polish immigrant men earn about 35 percent less than similarly qualified native-born majority males while Polish immigrant women earn about 39 percent less. Native-born Poles however, earn marginally more than native-born majority men and women.
Poland’s entry into the European Union in 2004, changed the dynamic of migration for Poles. Where prior to 2004 migration was likely a permanent decision, regardless of the host country, it is now far more fluid within the EU, while the migration decision remains largely permanent for Canada. This has caused Polish immigration to slow in Canada and to increase within the EU. Over the last decade and a half, Polish migrants have increasingly found employment in Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, Norway and Sweden. Indeed in 2015, Poles were the second largest intra-EU migration group after Romania (Eurostat, 2020, see also Fihel and Kacmarczky 2004).Footnote 5
Coyle (2007) provides an interesting take on Poland’s entry into the EU by looking at the context of women’s labour market equality and protection both within and outside Poland. She argues that prior to EU membership Polish women often obtained irregular work as cleaners or nannies that was precarious in nature. EU membership offers increased opportunities for work commensurate with skills outside Poland, but what is required is a legal framework for gender equality and rights in Poland, thereby allowing women to remain if they wish.
Overall past research points to large differentials in both employment probabilities and earnings for immigrants in general. In general, immigrants from Poland perform better than immigrants from outside Europe, and in the case of the UK and Germany can do the same or better than the native-born population (see Drinkwater et al., 2010; Kogan, 2010). As is to be expected, native-born Poles face much smaller differentials. Indeed, in Canada and Australia, native-born Polish men and women have basically the same probability of employment and similar wages after controlling for basic personal characteristics (see Pendakur & Pendakur, 1998, 2015 and Forrest & Kusek, 2016). Similarly, studies from the early and mid 2000s in Sweden find that Poles fare better than immigrants from outside Europe but still face substantial penalties in the labour market (Bevelander, 2000; Rosholm et al., 2006).
Clearly, migration context makes a difference in terms of self-selection of migrants and outcomes for Polish immigrants (see for example Ciupijus, 2011 and Drinkwater et al., 2010 Garapich, 2008, and Kogan, 2010). EU membership greatly reduced barriers to migration and allowed a larger number of Poles far greater choice in terms of host countries. This meant that Poles left Poland in greater numbers because those who would not have had the option to migrate prior to 2004 could leave with minimal costs and the option of a relatively easy return if things did not work out. However, membership, while reducing transactional barriers, does not reduce social barriers (see Friberg, 2012a). Poles who chose to migrate outside the EU faced largely the same barriers and conditions as they would have prior to 2004.
Expectations
Previous research has suggested that overall, Polish immigrants tend to fare well in many regimes (see Bevelander, 2000; Coyle, 2007; Drinkwater et al., 2010; Pendakur & Pendakur, 2015). However little work has been done which directly compares and assesses outcomes for this important group in more than one country. We assess labour force outcomes for Polish migrants and their children in Canada and Sweden. These two countries are characterized by similarly high levels of permanent migration, relatively easy access to citizenship and a dominantly urban immigrant population. As well, both Canada and Sweden are next door to a much bigger economic engine—the United States for Canada and Germany for Sweden.
As noted above, we assess two dimensions of labour force involvement—employment probabilities and market income. We look at both the log and rank of market income because we argue that the rank provides a better measure when comparing across two countries with different earnings distributions. We hypothesize that Polish immigrants will have higher employment rates in Canada, where the minimum wage is relatively low and therefore entry into the labour market is easier as compared to Sweden (see Bevelander & Pendakur, 2014).
Looking at the 2nd generation, previous research says that there should be few, if any differentials faced by the children of Polish immigrants—they are schooled and socialized in the host society and, for all intents and purposes are visibly identical to either Swedish-born Swedes or European-origin Canadians. In theory, second generation minorities (both men and women) should therefore approach the employment rate of the majority population.
The earnings distribution in Sweden is more compressed than in Canada.Footnote 6 We account for this difference by assessing, not only the differentials in labour market income but also the rank of different groups in the income distribution. It is widely acknowledged that immigrants face earnings penalties in most host countries. It should not be surprising therefore to see Polish immigrants facing earnings penalties in both Canada and Sweden. However, unless there are substantial differences in selection of migrants, there is no reason to suspect that the earnings penalties faced by Poles should be different across countries. As was the case for employment, when looking at the native-born Polish population, we do not expect to see substantive earnings differentials in either labour market income or rank of labour market income as compared to the majority population.
As discussed earlier, the entry of Poland into the EU in 2004 had a major impact on Polish migration flows. From a policy perspective, entry rules remained the same in Canada, but eased in Europe. Polish migration to Canada slowed substantially and rose in Sweden as EU barriers to migration were removed. In Sweden, because the easiest way to get permanency is to have a job, we expect to see high employment rates for Polish immigrants, but perhaps no real impact on earnings. In Canada, however, it is more ambiguous. Employment is not a precondition of entry for family class intake but for independent immigrants (which is roughly a third of the intake), having a job offer generally results in acceptance.